Phishing emails rarely announce themselves. They look like routine invoices, password resets, or messages from suppliers you know. That ordinariness is the point. In the UK, phishing is the most common breach type, reported by 38% of businesses in a government survey summarised by Alston & Bird, and 69% of affected businesses rate it as the most disruptive. Smaller firms are not exempt, so every team needs a practical way to spot fakes.
This beginner-friendly guide is for SME owners and office managers. It explains why phishing emails look so ordinary and how to know what normal looks like in your organisation. You will then work through four checks: whether the sender address matches the display name, whether there is an unexpected request to pay or change bank details, whether link text matches its true destination, and whether the message uses pressure, secrecy, or a slightly off tone. You will also learn a 60-second checking routine, how to build a reporting habit, and what to do in the first ten minutes if someone clicks. By the end, you should see that small, consistent habits beat perfect vigilance.
Why Phishing Emails Look So Ordinary
Phishing persists because it disguises itself as routine. Attackers choose formats nobody questions: a supplier invoice, a password reset, a delivery note, a payroll update. The aim is to be the least interesting item in the inbox. Survey interviews suggest phishing is easier to run and increasingly sophisticated. Publicity around high-profile incidents has not produced economy-wide resilience gains, so knowing about attacks is not the same as being ready for one. Around a third of UK businesses use, adopt or consider AI, but only 24% of that group had practices to manage the risks. Lures aimed at staff who use AI tools are a plausible emerging risk, not a measured trend. The starting point is knowing what normal looks like.
Before You Check Anything: Know What Normal Looks Like
You only notice something is off when you already know what normal looks like for each sender your team deals with regularly. Build that baseline once and every check later in this guide gets faster.
Start with a short known-good list covering the addresses and requests you see weekly: key suppliers, your bank, HMRC or Companies House, your payroll provider, your landlord and your IT provider. For each, note the correct domain, the usual format and who normally signs off.
Agreed rules beat individual judgement. If everyone knows that bank detail changes and payments above a set amount need second approval, an unusual request stands out immediately, rather than depending on how alert one person feels that morning. As a rule of thumb, treat any bank detail change arriving by email as unverified until confirmed by phone. Any bank change must be verified using a phone number or chat thread you already hold, never by replying to the email itself.
Finally, make it a team habit: share real examples in meetings and keep the list visible, so new starters and long-serving staff work from the same reference points.
Check One: The Sender Address Does Not Match the Name
Your known-good list is only useful if you open the full address. A display name proves nothing: it can read “Accounts” or your supplier’s trading name while the real address behind it belongs to someone else. In desktop Outlook or Gmail, click or hover the sender name to expand it; on mobile, tap the name to reveal it.
Then check the domain character by character. Attackers swap letters, so “rn” replaces “m”, or they add words and hyphens. Watch for a switch from .co.uk to .com or .net, and for a supplier name sitting in a subdomain of an unrelated domain. An address on free webmail claiming to represent a supplier, bank or government body is a strong warning sign.
A reply-to address that differs from the visible sender matters too: your carefully worded reply lands with the attacker, and the conversation continues with them.
Compare the full address against your known-good list. If a first-time contact asks for money, credentials or bank detail changes, treat the address as unverified until you confirm it another way. See the NCSC’s guidance on phishing scams for the authority to follow.
Check Two: An Unexpected Request to Pay or Change Bank Details
A genuine-looking sender address can still carry a fake request. Payment diversion fraud follows a familiar script: a supplier emails to say their bank details have changed, just as an invoice falls due. Or new bank details appear on a remittance you were already expecting.
Treat these as warning signs:
- A new account number and sort code arriving by email
- Pressure to pay the same day
- Claims the old account is closed or under audit
- A PDF invoice whose payment details do not match the ones already on file
Senior manager impersonation works the same way. A short, slightly odd message asks for an urgent transfer, framed as confidential and often timed for when that person is in meetings.
Legitimate businesses do change banks. The red flag is not the change itself but the channel and the pressure. Follow guidance from Ireland’s National Cyber Security Centre on invoice and payment diversion fraud: verify using a number you already hold, never one supplied in the email.
Three controls turn this from a judgement call into a process:
- Two-person approval above a set amount
- A callback to a known contact before using new bank details
- A written rule that email alone never changes payment instructions
Check Three: The Link Text and the Destination Do Not Match
Before clicking, preview where the link goes. On a computer, hover over it and read the address shown at the bottom of the screen. On a phone, press and hold until the destination appears. If the address has nothing to do with the organisation named in the email, stop there.
How to Read a Web Address
Read a URL from the first single slash backwards. The genuine domain sits immediately before that slash. A subdomain of a lookalike domain is not your bank’s site. Attackers also swap characters, such as rn for m.
Links and Attachments That Hide the Truth
Shortened links and “click here” buttons conceal the destination entirely. Treat unexpected shortened links as suspicious, even if the text looks routine. Attachments can carry the payload too: an HTML file posing as an invoice, or a “view document” button inside a PDF, may open a credential harvesting page rather than the file.
The Safe Route for Password Resets
For password resets, type the service address into your browser yourself or use a saved bookmark. Never sign in through a link in an email. As a rule of thumb, a genuine IT team does not need your password.
Check Four: Pressure, Secrecy and a Tone That Is Slightly Off

Pressure is the attacker’s tool for switching off the checks you just learned. Watch for deadlines such as “within the hour”, “before close of business” or “final notice”; each exists to rush you past the sender address and the link preview.
Treat secrecy and process bypass as red flags in almost any business context. Requests to keep a payment quiet, claims the sender cannot take a call, or instructions to skip the normal approval route all point to fraud. So does borrowed authority: an email claiming to come from a director, a regulator or a legal team, or a warning that an account will be suspended or a payment missed unless you act at once.
Small incongruities matter too. A colleague whose message does not sound like them, an unusual greeting, a changed signature block or a sudden switch from a work address to a personal one all deserve a second look. Be honest about grammar: polished attackers now avoid obvious errors, so poor spelling is a signal when it appears, not a requirement. Judge the request and the pressure, not the writing.
If any of these signals appear, run the short check below before you act.
A 60 Second Check for Any Suspicious Email
Tone and pressure give you a reason to look closer. This five step check is what turns that suspicion into a decision. It takes about a minute and needs no special tools.
- Name the ask. Decide what the email wants you to do: pay something, click a link, log in, or share information. Any of those earns a check, however familiar the sender looks.
- Expand the sender address. Compare its domain against your known-good list.
- Preview every link. Hover or long-press to reveal the destination before clicking.
- Ask whether the request is expected. Unexpected payment or credential requests fail the check regardless of how professional the message looks.
- Verify through a second channel. Use a saved phone number or an existing chat thread, never contact details supplied in the email itself.
Print these five steps as a one page desk prompt. A visible checklist makes the check routine rather than a memory test.
Building a Reporting Habit That Catches What Individuals Miss
Even careful staff will sometimes be unsure after the 60 second check. A clear reporting route turns that uncertainty into a signal IT can act on. Vigilance and reporting are two halves of the same control.
Give everyone one obvious route: a report button in Outlook or Gmail, a dedicated mailbox such as [email protected], or a named person on the IT team. Avoid leaving it at “tell your manager”; ambiguity is where reports get lost.
Reporting must be blameless. Fear of looking foolish is the main reason people stay quiet. Reward early reporting and never treat a false alarm as a mistake. Confirm receipt quickly, thank the person and share the outcome in general terms, so the team sees reporting changes something.
Controls reduce how many suspicious emails arrive at all. Email filtering, anti-spoofing standards, link rewriting and multi-factor authentication all reduce how many suspicious emails reach your staff, ask your IT provider which of these are configured. Only 47% of businesses reported having two-factor authentication in the survey, so there is room to improve. An IT provider can configure these and run short, regular awareness sessions, leaving staff fewer emails to judge.
If Someone Does Click: The First Ten Minutes

When a click happens, speed beats embarrassment. Tell IT or the reporting address immediately; early reports limit damage far more than a delay spent hoping nothing happens.
Immediate steps: change the password for the affected account from a different device. Then change that password anywhere else it was reused.
IT should then check for new mailbox forwarding rules, changed recovery addresses, unusual sign-in locations and any replies sent from the compromised account.
Expect a second wave. After a mailbox compromise, attackers often email suppliers and customers to redirect payments or request data. Watch follow-up messages over the next few days.
If money has already moved, contact your bank immediately. Report the incident to the UK’s national fraud and cybercrime reporting service and keep the original email and its headers as evidence. You can also forward suspicious emails to [email protected], where the NCSC investigates them.
Conclusion: Small Habits Beat Perfect Vigilance
Acting fast after a click is the last line of defence. Prevention rests on four habits the whole team can share: know what normal looks like for your recurring senders; check the sender address and the link destination; verify any payment or bank detail change by phone using a number you already hold; and report quickly, without fear.
Spotting phishing is not a talent some people are born with. It is a short set of checks and a reporting habit, and it works best when everyone follows the same process. The goal is not zero mistakes but early reporting. The four checks in this guide take about a minute per email and improve with practice.
Redjelli Technology supports small and medium businesses across Berkshire, Buckinghamshire, Hertfordshire and Greater London with IT support and cybersecurity, including email filtering, multi-factor authentication and staff awareness training. If you would like help setting up a reporting route or a known-good baseline for your team, get in touch.

